Our macroeconomic research since the beginning of 2009
OUR ANALYSIS HAS BEEN LARGELY BORNE OUT BY THE FACTS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 2009:
- Global recovery in 2009
- Outperformance of the US over Europe (from 2009) through the end of the decade
- The US’s capacity to generate around 2% GDP growth pa (2,3% pre-Covid-19)
- The eurozone recession starting in 2011 and ending in spring 2013
- The fact that the eurozone did not implode (despite numerous governance failures, which we highlighted several times)
- The eurozone’s protracted period of economic stagnation
- The ECB’s capacity to curb the European systemic risk (from 2012)
- The absolute necessity for central banks to undertake Quantitative Easing (from 2009)
- Further downgrading of France and Europe
- China’s structural slowdown in the 2020s
- Absence of inflation risk despite central banks in the rich world bloating their balance sheets hugely
- Survival of the bubble economy
- Japanisation of the eurozone and much of the rest of the world
- Donald Trump’s at times beneficial policies for the US
NEVERTHELESS WE DID NOT GET EVERYTHING RIGHT:
- We overestimated the potential of emerging economies (with the exception of China) and neglected their competitiveness issues, which materialised in the early 2010s
- We did not expect the oil price to plummet in H2 2014 and H2 2015
- We did not expect Brexit (2016)
- We misjudged the sharp slowdown of the eurozone in late 2018
- We failed to estimate the surge in inflation in the US and worldwide in late 2021 and early 2022
- We did not anticipate the war in Ukraine
